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In May 1643 Elisabeth da Bohemia addressed a question to Descartes which inaugurated a six-year
Correspondence,  until  his  death.  He  dedicates  his  mature  metaphysical  work  to  the  Princess
(Principles of First Philosophy, 1644) and writes Passions of the Soul (1649) as one of the results of
the  dialogue  with  the  philosopher  of  Bohemia.  The  silencing  of  the  last  hundred  years  of
historiography on Elisabeth of Bohemia's legacy in this epistolary exchange caused distortions and,
in some cases, underpinned the bias as a rule and as the history. One of the consequences of this
distortion is the interpretation according to which her first question would consist of a critique of
substantial dualism. In this study I suggest an interpretation of the nature of the first question, in
order to clarify the philosopher's thinking and her role in dialogue, in a comprehensive way, without
subscribing to the literary paradigm of the Cartesian soliloquy, and its bias.
Keywords: Elisabeth of Bohemia, René Descartes, epistolary exchange, theory of action, Prudence,
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Introduction
Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680)1 was an exiled Princess from the Thirty Years' War, who
corresponded with René Descartes (1596-1649). This epistolary exchange is the reference document
for the study of Elisabeth's philosophical thought and also for understanding how Descartes carries
forward implications of his method that, until she pushed him to think about it, were not clear even
to himself. The implications are both practical and psychological and are at the root of Descartes'
last work, Passions of the Soul (1649), which he wrote based on his dialogue with the philosopher
of Bohemia. The letters with Elisabeth challenge more than a hundred years of cultivation of the
rationalist canon and still deserve a long path of historical-conceptual research. What is known is
that  the  Correspondence  (with  some  lost  letters)  was  found  in  1876  and  published  in  1879
(Ebbersmeyer, 2020, p. 4), and that it was only at the end of the 20th century that Elisabeth began to
be removed from silencing, through the new philosophical historiography, marked by skepticism
towards the canon.
Thanks to the work of some philosophers, such as Lisa Shapiro, Sabbrina Ebbersmeyer and
Lilli Alanen, Elisabeth of Bohemia began to be studied on her own thought. This work is recent and
has against it not only the literary desert that followed the silencing of the philosopher Princess, but
the plethora of commentaries, theses, dissertations, books and essays on what Descartes replied to
1 To know more about Elisabeth’s life, see: de Lisa Shapiro, at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/elisabeth-bohemia/ my entry at: 
https://www.blogs.unicamp.br/mulheresnafilosofia/2020/10/19/elisabeth-da-bohemia/  and Ebbersmeyer’s entry below 
refereed.
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the Princess.  Elisabeth of Bohemia's  fame in philosophy goes hand in hand with silencing and
ignorance about what she thought and how she philosophically articulated her thinking, based on
her reading of Metaphysical Meditations (1641) and her dialogue with Descartes.
In this work, I seek to face this epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 129). The objective is
to offer an analysis of the tenacity of the issue made by Elisabeth, on May 6, 1643, who started the
epistolary  exchange  with  Descartes  of  more  than  6  years.  Elisabeth's  question  has  been
reconstructed at  least  four times in literature and,  it  will  be clear,  how one interprets  what  the
princess  of  Bohemia  asked  Descartes  governs  and  should  govern  the  interpretation  of  the
Correspondence as a whole. This also enable the treatment of this epistolary exchange as the Eighth
Objections and Replies2, because there are reasons to do so.  A fortiori, this document should be
recognized as  the conceptual  origin of  the rationalist  treatment  of  morality and politics,  which
Descartes  was  led  to  think  based on Elisabeth's  “finding”.  The  nature  of  this  "finding"  is  not
assented in the literature available so far, so that the path proposed here aims to respond to this
tension, in defense of an interpretation: Elisabeth questions Descartes about the practical nature of
his  foundationalist  project  and she does  not  criticize Cartesian ontology,  nor  does  she criticize
substantial dualism.
I will start from one of the philosopher's last letters and then analyze Elisabeth's position
backwards: that is, from her 1648 Letter to the May 1643 Letter. The choice for this path aims to
reconstruct the steps in order to offer an interpretation of the first question addressed to Descartes. I
hope,  in  the  end,  to  make  it  clear  that  this  first  question  has  a  programmatic  sense  in  the
Correspondence; and this goes for the first Letter, too, the role of the Princess's perspective on the
epistolary exchange.  The study of epistolary material and the contribution of non-canonical figures
to the history of philosophy in the early modern period makes the question of the very value of
question analysis an idle one: the nature of questions occupies modern philosophical reflection and
its method trope persistently. Even so, it is necessary to emphasize the meaning of this search, both
with a view to the existing literature as well as to the studies and eventual misunderstandings or
possible future regimentations. 
On the one hand, it can be said that dissecting philosophical issues through the exercise of
analysis is incurring an undue repetition. This would have been the mark of the practice of silencing
not only Elisabeth, but also many women philosophers, in the last hundred years of historiography.
On the other hand, doing this can and should be, I think, a way of identifying the relevance and
potency of the philosopher's questioning, in its conceptual aspect. The reconstruction and analysis
effort here consists in demonstrating why Elisabeth of Bohemia should be included in the modernist
2 Antonia Lolordo uses this name and I agree with this use, só, I’m using it here. 
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canon, and in the curricula. In doing so, the role of the philosophy of the Princess of Bohemia will
become clear, and so, hopefully, the literature that considered a Correspondence as a soliloquy of
Descartes shall be reconsidered.
From the expressive unity of the moral conscience to the origin of Passions of the Soul (July
1648 to 13 September 1645)
In one of her last letters, in July 1648, Elisabeth of Bohemia puts herself in the third person
by formulating in a comprehensive way what she considers acting morally. She asserts that moral
action is that through which conscience aims at “seeking her satisfaction only in the expression that
her conscience gives her of having done what she must3 (ATV, 210-211, p.173). This could be taken
as a claim of what moral happiness consists in: satisfying one's conscience in the face of actions
taken. She is not just referring to a “quiet conscience” but satisfied with her own accomplishments.
Satisfaction comes later, as a reflection upon the acts themselves that must be pursued as much as
on their performance; so, the conception of moral action can be reconstructed as one in which 1)
there is a search for satisfaction of one's own conscience; 2) this satisfaction occurs when the acts
themselves are done. Thus, Elisabeth introduces the satisfaction of self-awareness (a conscience that
thinks  and  evaluates  itself)  as  a  constitutive  element  of  morality,  guaranteed  by  a  reflexive
diachrony:  the  acts  performed,  that  which  results  from  actions  that  are,  in  turn,  conscious.
Everything  happens,  therefore,  as  if  morality  had  a  self-referential  dimension  that  not  only
establishes the search for satisfaction but also claims influence on the acts performed. As for these,
they are not detached from the conscious infrastructure, neither on departure nor on arrival, that is
to say, neither in the beginning of the acting process nor in the reflection upon what was done.
Elisabeth would defend, thus, a unity from which the will to act is guided and on which rests the
possibility of verification to attest that that action was a moral action.
 The notion of “moral conscience”, there, follows a pattern of use of “conscience”4 by the
philosopher, and, in this case, it is instantiated in the third person. In doing so, in 1648, Elisabeth no
longer  situates  herself  as  a  student,  but  as  a  philosopher  in  proper  sense,  offering  a  theory of
morality  not  only  consistent  with  Cartesianism,  rather  as  a  version  elaborated  throughout  the
dialogue. On this path, what is sought is the chain of reasons that lead Elisabeth to the formulation
of moral action as an action that is both conscious and prudent. For, despite the irreducible presence
of psychological traits inside of moral's approach, one should not lose sight of the fact that the
3 I’m using the Correspondence translation and edition by Lisa Shapiro. 
4    In a forthcoming paper I explore the use of conscience as conscientia, by the Princess. 
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concern with objectivity and responsibility for one's actions, in front of others, in fact prevents one
from taking the Elisabeth's philosophical thought as a psychology.
 In this way, the satisfaction of conscience in face of one's own acts rests on a social measure,
which  determines  the  criterion  of  objectivity  and  responsibility  for  actions  and  presupposes
practical knowledge. To this knowledge, however, there is not an assumption of a metaphysical
frame;  rather,  an  intrinsically  social  trait  in  the  moral  view as  presented  by the  Princess.  The
satisfaction of one's own conscience relies on an irremediable observance of the context and related
requirements from the position of power that she plays by being part of a family such as hers. This
observance is considered from Descartes' assertion, in the Letter of September 1, 1645, claiming a
connection between free will and knowledge of the path necessary to achieve true happiness (AT IV,
282, p. 106); for Descartes, both freedom and knowledge of what is best for one's own happiness
depend exclusively on the exercise of one's own rationality, independently (and despite what goes
on in the world), on what goes on within, at the passionate level. To this radically internalist version
of rationalism, if one can say so, Elisabeth responds in three stages, on September 13, 1645, in the
letter that, according to Lisa Shapiro (Shapiro, 2007, p.110, note 79), contains the root of Passions
of the Soul, due to its programmatic tune.  
The three steps are as follows: 1) Elisabeth establishes that social position obliges and may
harm the exercise of free will: “...my birth and my fortune have forced me to exercise my judgment
earlier than most, in order to lead a life that is very trying and free of the prosperity that could
prevent me from thinking of myself and also free of the subjection that would have obliged me to
rely on the prudence of a governess” (ATIV, 282, p. 110); 2) the knowledge of the correct path, or
the good to be pursued, needs determination, since otherwise, access to an "infinite science" would
be necessary, which would result in the impossibility of exercising freedom, because we have no
way to know everything: 
(“It  is  true  that  a  habit  of  esteeming  good  things  according  to  how  they  can  contribute  to
contentment,  measuring  this  contentment  according  to  the  perfections  which  give  birth  to  the
pleasures, and judging these perfections and these pleasures without passion will protect them from
a number of faults. But in order to esteem these goods in this way, one must know them perfectly.
And in order to know all these goods among which one must choose in an active life, one would
need to possess an infinite science” (ATIV, 289, p. 110), 
and finally 3) Elisabeth asks Descartes to explain why she has passions that drive her to reasonable
actions. In the Letters that follow, from September 13, 1645 to July, 1648, on several occasions
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Elisabeth reiterates that she is not interested in doing metaphysics. What I want to emphasize, in
order to shed light on the intelligibility of the first question, however, is that the philosopher does
not think of moral actions outside of a context and the positions of power at play in that context; in
fact,  the  opposite  occurs,  from which  it  follows  that  power  relations,  in  society,  would  entail
different levels of responsibility, including at the moral level, according to her. It also follows that
moving away from the demand for infinite science goes hand in hand with the recognition of a
constructive or cooperative dimension with morality, including in the passionate domain. It also
follows that one can think, from the Letter of September 13, 1645, that power relations, practical
knowledge and the role of affections constitute the moral determination of actions that can satisfy
the agent's conscience.
The most rational method for treating the mind (July 16, 1645 to May 18, 1645)
Between May 1643 and July 16, 1645 the Correspondence between Descartes and Elisabeth
undergoes a change. From may 1643 to May 1645, Descartes and Elisabeth continued to discuss
from what Descartes replies to Elisabeth in his first letter to her, where he suggests that she would
be referring to his ontology, only, and she then engages in the discussion about mind and body
interaction.  On  May  18,  1645  (ATIV,  200),  Descartes  writes  to  Elisabeth  communicating  his
surprise at her state of health and then he moves himself toward a practical conversation in order to
help his friend, the Princess. That is how Descartes turns to Seneca, and his “Da Vida Beata” as a
possible reading for therapeutic effects, to treat Elisabeth's sadness. The philosopher then adds some
critical notes to Seneca's Stoicism and goes so far as to say (August 1645 – ATIV, 263) that he
indicated the neo-Stoic reading for his reputation rather than for any alignment with his program.
The problem with Stoicism, according to  Descartes,  is  the admission of a heterogeneity
between fortune and happiness. According to this critique, inasmuch as good fortune, to Seneca,
depends on something external to us, those who are fortunate are so without having contributed in
any measure  to  it,  whereas,  according  to  Descartes,  the  true  happiness  consists  of  “a  perfect
contentment of the mind and an internal satisfaction that those who are the most favored by fortune
ordinarily do not have and that the sages acquire without fortune’s favor” (ATIV, 264, p. 97). By
placing happiness in the domain of subjectivity, Descartes in this same letter adds an observation to
his provisional moral code as presented in the Third Part of the Discourse on Method, to which he
resorts. The Provisional Moral Code contains three rules: 1) try to use the mind as well as possible,
in order to know what should be done or what should not be done, in every event of life; 2) have a
firm and  constant  resolution  to  execute  all  that  reason  advises  him to  do,  without  having  the
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passions or appetites turning him away from it. (Descartes takes this firmness as a virtue) and, 3)
the good that one has is what one can possess and there are goods that cannot be possessed and one
must be content with that when 1) is observed (ATIV, 265, p.98). 
Descartes recognizes in this firmness, “as no one has ever explained it in this way”, a virtue;
an  exclusively  rational  and  solitary  decision.  Elisabeth's  reply,  August  16,  1645,  contains  two
aspects  that  illuminate  the  conception  of  morality  in  her  thought.  First,  she  asks  Descartes  to
proceed  by  correcting  Seneca,  a  philosopher  she  considers  to  think  “without  method”,  since
Descartes would provide the most natural method, insofar as he makes her “draw from my mind
pieces  of  knowledge  I  have  not  yet  apprehended”  (ATII,  269,  p.  100).  She  then  establishes  a
distinction between a philosophical conception and an experience, using the example of the way a
philosopher, Epicurus, dealt with his own kidney stones, as if to point out that this was not her
perspective. This observation, at the end of this Letter, highlights the rejection that the Princess of
Bohemia  makes,  both  to  the  hypothesis  of  an  infinite  science  (ATIV,  289)  as  an  “infinite
knowledge” (ATIV, 405, p. 134), in order to guide or determine the moral criterion of the actions
themselves5. 
In this Letter, Elisabeth questions not only Seneca's use, but Descartes' position of taking the
firmness of reason as a sufficient virtue. She states: 
“I do yet know how to rid myself of the doubt that one can arrive at the true happiness of which you
speak without the assistance of that which does not depend absolutely on the will. For there are
diseases that destroy altogether the power of reasoning and by consequence that of enjoying a
satisfaction of reason” (ATIV, 269, p. 100). 
To treat the disease, then, there is at least one remedy that has been interesting, namely, to
find in one's mind pieces of knowledge that had not yet been apprehended. She intends, as she says
at the end of the letter, that Descartes will continue to clarify her doubts, aiming enable the exercise
of virtue. And this exercise would be aimed at the Princess's mind, in order to cure her of the kind
of illness that impedes the fruition of reason. Elisabeth seems to relate her suffering to a weakness
of the will. In doing so, she touches on a central element of the Cartesian project, which is the
unicity of the mind; a unit such that it does not contain faculties because it does not admit discrete
zones.  
When the philosopher mentions the will, in the quotation above, she ponders about if there
would  be  not  another  element,  constitutive  of  the  mind,  which  Descartes  would  not  have
5 See note 64, p. 100, in Shapiro’s edition.
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considered. The most rational method for treating the mind, according to Elisabeth, requires two
exercises  of  reflection:  removing  pieces  of  knowledge  from  the  mind  that  had  not  yet  been
apprehended and pondering the eventual role of some other element, not absolutely dependent on
the will. Elisabeth knows that when Descartes mentions "firmness of reason" he is not excluding,
but including, the will. These reflections follow from one of the Princess' responses to Descartes,
when the exchange of letters was still going on as a dialogue between student and teacher. In this
period,  the first  two years of dialogue,  the discussion is  based on Descartes'  interpretation that
Elisabeth would be curious or interested in his ontology and in the nature of the interaction between
mind and body. Until May 18, 1645, the princess engages in the discussion proposed by Descartes,
although, as will become clear below, she has not at any time abdicated the issue that motivated her.
From the extension of the mind to moral actions (July 1, 1643 to May 6, 1643)
In the Letter of July 1, 1643, Elisabeth writes for the third time, in this Correspondence, to
Descartes. The letter has three parts and, in the third and second, it can be observed that Elisabeth
was clear about the unicity of the mental. Before dive into that, however, it is necessary to mention
the discussion that was taking place, starting from Descartes' first reply, with which he introduces
the theory of primitive notions: the primitive notion of the mind, the primitive notion of the body
and the primitive notion of the union between mind and body. According to Descartes, Elisabeth
would had made a mistake in expecting one primitive notion to carry out a movement proper and
exclusively of the other. This theory, which in fact occupies the first two years of the epistolary
exchange, from Elisabeth's point of view is not the decisive element or what seems to drive her
philosophical inquiry. She engages in the discussion proposed by Descartes, that's for sure, but she
insists on the same point until Descartes communicates that he has learned of the Princess' state of
health.  The  20th  century  canon  focused  on  these  first  2  years  of  the  Correspondence,  thus
strengthening the soliloquy bias, as will become clear. If one looks at the Correspondence in its
entirety,  or  if  even these first  two years  are  considered a  dialogue rather  than  a  soliloquy,  the
conclusions may be surprising.
Descartes  responds  to  Elisabeth  on  June  28,  1643,  presenting  the  theory  of  “primitive
notions”, which would be intelligible from the geometric paradigm of the “problem of the three
circle”. Says the philosopher:
“The Soul is conceived only by the pure understanding [l’entendement]; the body, that is to say,
extension, shapes, and motions, can also be known by the understanding alone, but is much better
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known by the understanding aided by imagination; and, finally, those things which pertain to the
union of the soul and thee body are known only obscurely by the understanding alone, or even by
the understanding aided by the imagination; but they are known very clearly by the senses”  (ATIII,
692, pp. 69-70). 
In this  remark Descartes aligns his ontology with epistemology, and does so in order to
clarify to the Princess how he understands our mode of knowledge of mental things, if you can say
so, and of non-mental movements, or movements proper to bodies (the mechanism) captured by the
imagination. Then, he makes a distinction between the philosophical perspective and that of the
imagination,  and emphasizes  that  the  former,  not  the  latter,  must  be  taken into  account  in  the
Meditations and suggests that Elisabeth had an obscure understanding of the relationship between
soul and body. (ATIII, 694, p. 72). If Elisabeth's remarks are taken seriously, however, it becomes
clear that if she was not referring to the sense of movement or action, at least she was clear about
the status of the mental. This is exactly what is read in her answer, in the Letter of July 1, 1643,
after considering the thesis on the three primitive notions.
“I also find that the senses show me that the soul moves the body, but they teach me nothing (no
more than do the understanding and the imagination) of the way in which it  does so. For this
reason, I think that there are some properties of the soul, which are unknown to us, which could
perhaps overturn what your Metaphysical Meditations persuaded me of by such good reasoning:
the nonextendedness of the soul. This doubt seems to be founded on the rule that you give there, in
speaking of the true and the false, that all error comes to us in forming judgments about that which
we do not perceive well enough”. (AT, IV, 2-3 – emphasis mine). 
By asserting that the senses teach her nothing, Elisabeth is  aligned with a philosophical
position and seems to respond to Descartes, telling him that she is not confusing notions. Rather,
she makes considerations about the nature of mind and mentions eventual opacity of mental states.
So she seems to exclude pure understanding, while denying that this unknown part belongs to the
imagination (if it was imagination that she had in mind, there would be no reason not to mention it,
instead of mentioning some “part unknown"). At the same time, she knows that considering some
discret zone is not allowed due to the unicity of the mind, hence the identification of that as “non-
extense” - which is enough, for the economy of Meditations, at least. It is not by other reason that
she referees to the Fourth Meditation, in order to point out that the problem she is interested in is
that which responds by the assertion between true and false. She seems to align with Cartesianism
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including taken profit from the theory of primitive notions, insofar she recognizes that the senses
don’t teach anything with respect to the nature of action, so much so that it is legitimate to infer
that, for Elisabeth, knowledge has an important role in her question. Yet, Elisabeth says, in the same
letter, that she is not aligned with the scholastic thesis tota in toto et tota in singulis partibus, with
which Thomas (from Book VII of Aristotle's Physics, in the Summa Theologiae, Part I, Question 8,
art. 2 and 3)) responds to the challenge of the spatial divisibility of God, with the defense of his
total presence in the whole and in each part, through which the indivisibility of the soul would
remain assured6. The search for an extension of mind in Elisabeth's letters, however it seems to
make sense, depends on a step she does not take, in the distinction between extension and the body.
She even mentions the scholastic notion in order to contrast with her own and to emphasize that this
is not what she had in mind in her first question and that, therefore, she may have been wrong in
confusing domains (a hypothesis she more verbally admits than in fact, as one can read, insofar as
she maintains the same position), but did not, therefore, fall under a scholastic dogmatism. What
happens is that Elisabeth ends the letter saying that it was Descartes, and only Descartes, who made
her abandon skepticism. Therefore, if the inquiry aimed at seeking, in Elisabeth, an investigation
into the extension of the soul, prospers, it will not have been from what she affirms in July 1643,
and even less from an alignment with the Thomistic metaphysics.
As the reading progresses, the closer we come to Elisabeth's fundamental question, which,
as I suggest, is the first. So far, it is worth noting once more, with respect to the aforementioned,
that the Princess engages in the discussion of Cartesian ontology in the first two years, but this does
not mean that she and Descartes were trying to clarify the same things or that they were, let's say,
"on the same page". In this answer, she makes it clear that, although she may be wrong to have
confused the domains of “notions”, she understood dualism and the real distinction argument; as
well as that she read the Sixth Replies. Then, in the June 1643 Letter, she seems to reformulate her
question: 
“I hope, as an excuse for my stupidity in being unable to comprehend, by appeal to the idea you
once had of  heaviness,  the idea through which we must  judge how the soul (nonextended and
immaterial) can move the body, nor why this power [puissance] to carry the body toward the center
6 Schmaltz has a distinct interpretation of this passage. For him, Elisabeth would not be totally removed from the
scholastic perspective, as, in this same letter, she states that extension is not necessary to thought, but that is why it is
not repulsive to her, thus suggesting that the philosopher is somehow in search of an extension of the mind. This reading
might be adequate if Elisabeth had not stated, a few sentences later, that 2) her “first doubt” remains open and she
cannot free herself from it. See: Tad Schmaltz:  Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia on the Cartesian Mind: Interaction,
Happiness,  Freedom. In: Feminist History of Philosophy: The Recovery and Evaluation of Women’s Philosophical
Thought, O’Neill and Marcy Lascano (Eds), pp. 155-173
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of the earth, which you earlier falsely attributed to a body as a quality, should sooner persuade us
that a body can be pushed by some immaterial thing, than the demonstration of a contrary truth
(which you promise in your physics) should confirm us in the opinion of its impossibility”  (AT, VII,
685, p. 68). 
Here, Elisabeth may seem to concede that she was wrong, by confusing primitive notions.
At the same time, the philosopher observes that the explanation derived from physics (here is the
example of weight, as presented in the Sixth Replies) is not, nevertheless, the one adequate to her
inquiry. Elisabeth's considerations show that she was not mistaken, exactly – even when conceding
or  pretending  to  had  been  so.  For,  in  this  same  letter  of  June  10,  1643,  she  states:  "But  I,
nevertheless have never been able to conceive of such an immaterial thing as anything other than
the negation of matter which cannot have any communication with it". (AT, III, 685, p.68). And she
continues:
“I admit that it would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the soul than to concede
the capacity to move a body and to be moved by it  to an immaterial thing.  For, if  the first  is
achieved through information, it would be necessary that the spirits, which cause the movements,
were intelligent, a capacity you accord to nothing corporeal”. (Ditto)
Here it is worth noting Shapiro's observations, in a note of her translation, in which she
suggests the possibility of a dialogue with the Aristotelian tradition or with an eventual intentional
trait characteristic of the Stoic treatment of cognitive faculties (Shapiro 2007, note 12, p. 68). This
path deserves attention. There is a possibility that Elisabeth had a philosophical expression more
distant from Cartesianism (Lolordo 2019, p. 85 and Ebbersmeyer 2020, p. 4, suggest an Epicurean
influence  on the philosopher's  thinking).  However,  the  philosopher  of  Bohemia herself  has  her
doubt based on the Meditations. That's what she says next:
“And, even though, in your Metaphysical Meditations, you show the possibility of the second, it is
altogether very difficult to understand that a soul, as you have described it, (…) can lose all of this
by some vapors, and that, being able to subsist without the body, and having nothing in common
with it, the soul is still so governed by it”. (AT, III, 685, p. 68). 
What Elisabeth is asserting here is that if the analogy with weight (as indicated by Descartes
in the Sixth Replies) does not apply, as it would be the result of a confusion in the use of primitive
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notions, still, she remains finding it difficult to understand the action of the body on the mind, and
that is why she mentions the hypothesis of “loss of vapors”, which would be applicable if the soul
were material, which she does not concede. It is worth remembering that her first question seems to
lead  to  a  difficulty  in  the  opposite  direction.  Elisabeth  does  not  seem satisfied  with  the  mere
assertion that there is a primitive notion of union. And this appears clearly in the hypothesis she
mentions of the body ruling the mind. For Shapiro (1999, p. 503), there would be an affirmation of
a materialist or non-Cartesian trait of Elisabeth; she would have suggested a candidacy originating
from the movement that  might  not  be thought,  since,  according to  Descartes,  she would have,
incorrectly,  sought in thought a somewhat unauthorized origin for her question (she would had
mixed primitive notions in a wrong way). 
Elisabeth's  problem with candidacies  to  replace pure understanding is  that  she does not
intend to move away from Cartesianism. The opposite happens. It is because she conceives the
oneness of mind that she seeks to discard the materiality of the mental, on the one hand, and the
discussion itself about dualism, which, after the turn in Correspondence in July 1645, disappears
from the dialogue, while the concern with the moral nature of actions is preserved by her and then
on,  by  Descartes  himself.  This  tells  us  something  about  what  moved  Elisabeth  to  seek  an
explanation  after  reading  the  Metaphysical  Meditations.  The  point  here  is  that  the  Princess
philosopher’s  fundamental  concern is  of a  practical  nature in  a  strong sense,  and not a  further
inquiry into theology or ontology.
Based on the above, one can read Elisabeth's first question, as well as the end of the first
letter she addressed to Descartes, with a view informed by dialogue rather than soliloquy. Along
these lines,  we will  be able  to  read what  Elisabeth said and the reasons why she does  it  in  a
consistent  relationship  with  all  her  letters  throughout  the  Correspondence,  although,  from July
1645, in a more elaborated way, when a dialogue between pairs is finally established, after the letter
of September 13, 1645. 
Here, finally, is Elisabeth's first question:
“I ask you please to tell me how the soul of a human being (it being only a thinking substance) can
determine  the  bodily  spirits  in  order  to  bring  about  voluntary  actions.  For  it  seems  that  all
determination of movement happens through the impulsion of the thing moved, by the manner in
which it is pushed by that which moves it,  or else by the particular qualities and shape of the
surface of the latter. Physical contact is required for the first two conditions, extension, for the
third. You entirely exclude the one  [extension] from the notion you have of the soul, and other
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[physical contact] appears to me incompatible with an immaterial thing”. (16 de maio de 1643,
ATIII, 661, p. 62).
The reader who came to this page may have already understood that this is a question about
the origin of voluntary actions and not an ontological doubt. Elisabeth seems to say just this: how
does the mind, being one and not material, give rise to moral actions? Then, she proceeds to discard
the hypotheses she knows she cannot resort to, in order to found or give rise to what she seeks to
know, namely, voluntary actions. Of course, one can interpret this question about the origin of the
movement, or the origin of the motor relation in the mind-body direction. Or one might regard this
question as a doubt about the way Descartes treats moral actions, considering his ontology; one can
consider this a purely ontological question, or one can consider it a purely practical question. Until
today, if I’m not wrong, there are four reconstructions of this first question and, according to what
was presented above, only one of these reconstructions seems to fit as translation of what Elisabeth
had in mind, especially if we consider the Correspondence as a set.
The first reconstruction to be considered is that of Daniel Garber, who deals with Elisabeth's
question under the framework of the concept of movement. He proposes an interpretation according
to which what is at  issue is the conceivability of the motion between substances. According to
Garber, Descartes' adequate reply to the Princess of Bohemia would have to be inspired not by the
Meditations but by the The World. For Garber, Elisabeth's question is this: “she wants Descartes to
explain how a nonextended and incorporeal mind can literally make contact with and imple and
extended body?” (Garber 2001, p. 178). The consistent response to Elisabeth, by Descartes, would
be a response anchored in the intelligibility of the mind and body interaction. For Lisa Shapiro,
probably the first philosopher to investigate Elisabeth's thought, the question of the philosopher is
focused on the problem of the union between mind and body. From the first letter onwards, the
Princess of Bohemia would have made it clear that what is at stake is knowing how something
immaterial  and  not  extensive  can  move  something  material  and  extensive.  Shapiro  identifies
Elisabeth's own philosophical position as neither materialist nor dualist, but rather aimed at “finding
a way of respecting the autonomy of thought without denying that this faculty of reason is in some
essential  way  dependent  on  our  bodily  condition”  (Shapiro,  1999,  p.  505).  For  Sabrina
Ebbersmeyer,  Elisabeth  of  Bohemia  asks  Descartes  this:  “how can one account  for  mind-body
interaction  under  the  conditions  of  Cartesian  substance  dualism?”  (Ebbersmeyer  2020,  p.  5).
According to the last two readings, the question of the Princess of Bohemia would be turned to a
difficulty in Descartes' mechanism, which admits the movement of bodies exclusively by contact. A
12
fourth interpretation seems more in line with Elisabeth's  thinking, and is  suggested by Thomas
Lennon. Accordingly, the question would had been as following: 
“How it is that through volition the mind is able to move the body. The latter was explicitly raised
as a problem for Descartes by Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (to whom Descartes was soon to
dedicate his Principles of Philosophy). Her concern was that the soul, or mind, seems incapable of
affecting the body in order to bring about voluntary actions. According to Descartes, she argued,
initiation of motion depends on contact with its cause, which itself must have properties depending
on extension, whereas both contact and extension are precluded from the mind”. (May 6/16, 1643
– my emphasis – Lennon, 2008, p. 478)
These four reconstructions offer manifold answers or interpretations, as it may seems. What
does  not  seem  susceptible  to  disagreements,  however,  is  that  Descartes  did  not  respond
satisfactorily to Elisabeth.  Although it  is  curious  that there is  agreement  that  Descartes did not
answer the philosopher, his answers were the object of interest in historiography literature, as if he
had been in  a  soliloquy,  and it  is  also  strange that  this  question  was taken solely as  a  further
discussion  of  the  costs  of  abandoning  Scholasticism  as  a  metaphysical  paradigm.  Descartes
responds in an unsatisfactory and unnecessary way (according to Garber), with the use of “primitive
notions”: the primitive notion of mind, the primitive notion of body and the primitive notion of
union between mind and body. The clarification of the interaction mechanism could be made by
attributing  to  Elisabeth  the  error  of  borrowing  notions  from  physics,  that  is,  the  notions  of
movement between bodies. By resorting to these "primitive notions" (which seem to stand in for an
adhoc hypotheses), Descartes provides no positive answer to Elisabeth's question. This diagnosis by
Garber  seems  irrefutable,  although  his  defense  of  “how  Descartes  should  have  responded  to
Elisabeth” (the subtitle of his paper) dispenses with a careful consideration of the whole of the
epistolary exchange.
However, Garber draws attention to a crucial element: the asymmetry between mind and
body and the sense of movement that mobilizes Elisabeth,  which is  the mind-body movement.
Given that the philosopher Elisabeth discards the physical foundation of what is happening and, as
we can read in the letter of September 13, 1645, she does not anchor herself in an inquiry of a
metaphysical nature, it can be inferred that her first question is, in fact, as it is written, a question
about  the  origin  of  moral  actions.  It  is,  therefore,  a  practical  matter  in  the  strict  sense,  if  the
Correspondence, and not only the first two years, is considered. It is on this path that the turning
point in the exchange of letters must be understood from an inter-locution among equals, from May
13
1645 onwards, when Descartes informs, with surprise and regret, that he had learned of the health
situation of the Princess of Bohemia. 
A close look at the first letter, however, shows that there is no reason for this surprise. At the
end of the first letter, after formulating her question, Elisabeth, before saying goodbye, makes a
request to the philosopher.
“Knowing that you are the best doctor for my soul, I expose t you quite freely the weaknesses of its
speculations, and hope that in observing the Hippocratic oath, you will supply me with remedies
without making them public, such I beg of you to do, as well, as to suffer the badgerings of” (AT,
III, 662 – my emphasis).
In a translation note (note 6, p. 62), Shapiro proceeds to clarify the historical sources of
Hippocrates  in  order  to  establish  that  it  was  a  well-known  oath  to  both  interlocutors.  The
Hippocratic Oath is not just a pact of good manners, which a supposedly shy princess would have to
address to a philosopher. The Hippocratic oath is and was and has always been a pact concluded
between patient and physician, which involves a therapy. This reading now proposed gains strength
insofar as Descartes starts to dedicate himself to helping his friend, so that the hypothesis that he is
trying to repair an inattention makes sense. As already presented above, Descartes then turns to
Seneca and Elisabeth makes him search,  in his own philosophy, for an answer.  Whether in the
Fourth Meditations, or in the considerations about the object that provides the criterion at the same
time of satisfaction of conscience and moral responsibility,  Elisabeth does not  give up that the
answer to her question is of Cartesian nature. 
Conclusion: a promising reconstruction
One way to reconstruct the first question is to interrogate the philosopher's intention and
another is to interrogate what she claims. If we observe what she takes as a moral action, in one of
the last letters, namely: the satisfaction in the expression that the agent has before herself, given the
fact of having acted correctly (AT,V, 210-211), we can see in this formulation an elaborated version
of the question about the origin of moral actions, given that the driving relationship between bodies
is not what explains morality (as she has already said, even in the Letter of June 10, 1643, to discard
the weight analogy as in the Sixth Replies). By providing an internal and derivative relationship of a
unity of mind, Elisabeth leads Descartes, throughout Correspondence and, with force, in Passions
of the Soul, to seek, at the same time, the rule for acting prudently and the satisfaction of one's own
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conscience. By introducing a logical and epistemological form of subjectivity, on the ground of the
foundation of knowledge, and by proposing a non-scholastic ontological furniture, Descartes ended
up being led,  too,  to consider the practical  implications of his  method in the domain of moral
actions. And it was Elisabeth of Bohemia who led him to seek to formulate a theory of the passions
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